



Border/Control

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Abstract

How might we historicize the idea of border control? If state borders can be understood as institutional sites of governance, what forms of governance do they enact? This article asks what insights Foucauldian political sociology might offer these questions. Drawing on Deleuze's analytic of 'control', the article seeks to bring new meaning to the idea of border control. Understanding control as a particular technology of power, special attention to the changing topography of border control as well as the changing subjectivities presupposed by this form of power is paid.

Key words

■ borders ■ control ■ Deleuze ■ discipline ■ Foucault

Rebordering

In a recent series of studies, political scientist Peter Andreas and his colleagues have done much to further our understanding of the changing nature and the function of state borders in the 'advanced industrialized regions of the world' at the start of the twenty-first century (Andreas, 2003; Andreas and Biersteker, 2003; Andreas and Snyder, 2000). Citing such developments as sharply rising law enforcement budgets for border controls, new legislation targeted at unauthorized entries and mobilities, the deployment of sophisticated surveillance and information technology, stricter visa controls and the augmented role of military personnel, methods and hardware, they argue we are witnessing nothing less than the 'rebordering' of the state (Andreas, 2003: 79). In this way, they pose a challenge to the more breathless pronouncements of certain theorists who, by the start of the 1990s, had come to equate globalization with the advent of a 'borderless world':

The celebrated debordering of the state . . . is far more selective than the inflated rhetoric of globalization would suggest. Debordering is being accompanied in many places by a partial rebordering in the form of enhanced policing. Even as many borders have been demilitarized in the traditional realm of national security, as well as economically liberalized to facilitate commercial exchange, they are also now more criminalized to deter those who are perceived as trespassers. Thus it may be more accurate to say that the importance of territoriality is shifting rather than simply diminishing. (Andreas, 2000: 3)

The term 'genealogy' is perhaps slightly alien to the kind of academic international relations audience to whom Andreas directs his argument. Nevertheless, I want to suggest that the account of 'rebordering', which he and his associates provide, might be read as a significant contribution to a genealogy of the border. It might be considered in this methodological light not least because it refuses the totalizing assumptions of liberal globalization theory in favour of a more patient and historicized form of inquiry that is attuned to mapping what one might call the changing territory and political rationality of border control.

In reflecting on genealogy as a method, Foucault argued for a form of critical social analysis focused on 'events', moments when an existing regime of practices is reinvested, co-opted and redeployed by new social forces and governmental rationalities. To study events is to rediscover 'the connections, encounters, supports, blockages, plays of forces, strategies and so on which at a given moment establish what subsequently counts as being self-evident, universal and necessary' (Foucault, 1991: 76). For instance, one cannot understand the birth of modern punishment without recognizing how an existing, and, in many ways, ancient practice like internment – which could serve multiple functions such as the sequestration of the insane or the suppression of political dissent – was put to new purposes once it was invested by practices of legal punishment.

Can something comparable can be said about rebordering today? As Andreas notes, borders have long been associated with the military defence of the national territory from opposing, and often neighbouring armies. They also have a history as privileged sites of commercial regulation, such as customs and excise. But today, it seems, borders are becoming more and more important not as military or economic practices but as spaces and instruments for the policing of a variety of actors, objects and processes whose common denominator is their 'mobility' (Adey, 2004), or more specifically, the forms of social and political insecurity that have come to be discursively attached to these mobilities (Bigo, 2002; Huysmans, 1995).

This article will offer some preliminary observations regarding Foucauldian political sociology, and what it might bring to recent studies of the transformation of state borders. Foucauldian political sociology has developed as an important site of theorization about contemporary as well as historical trends in power and governance (Barry et al., 1996; Burchell et al., 1991; Dean, 1999; Rose, 1999). Forging productive connections between political and social theory, political economy, criminology and sociology, it has fashioned a distinctive approach to political power. Among its hallmarks are a concern with the place of expertise within strategies of governance; the pivotal place of self-governance and subjectivity within modes of power; and an eschewal of grand theories of modernity in favour of a more empirical, and in a sense more situated, understanding of governance understood at the level of various strategies, technologies, programmes and techniques (Barry et al., 1996: 4). These studies have been particularly preoccupied with liberal and neo-liberal governance, and with understanding how these strategies are assembled in particular domains, employing specific practices and identities. Given the keen interest these studies have

shown in the political management of population, it is somewhat strange that they have paid little attention to the regulatory functions of borders.¹ One aim of this article will be to explore some ways this particular oversight might be addressed.

However, there is more at stake than simply extending the empirical scope of Foucauldian political sociology. My bigger claim is that this perspective offers a way to express the 'rarity' (Veyne, 1997: 159), and hence raise the intelligibility of current practices of border control. To pose the question of their rarity is to emphasize that however much we may have come to take political talk of 'border security' for granted, this term actually denotes a very particular and unique set of power relations. Foucault's studies of madness, crime and sexuality have taught us how to think about power in terms of its 'dispositions, manoeuvres, tactics, techniques, functionings' (Foucault, cited in Deleuze, 1988: 25). But what kinds of dispositions and functionings characterize the border today?

Foucauldian political sociology has stressed the polyvalence and multiplicity of power relations. This point bears emphasizing because of the way in which references to Foucault sometimes draw a rather narrow equation with discipline, surveillance, and more often than not, the stark architectural figure of the panopticon. Yet a quick glance over Foucault's *œuvre*, not to mention the countless studies to take up his hypotheses, reveals a strikingly rich and heterogeneous field. Studies of disciplinary power and surveillance, of course, are prominent but far from exhaustive. For we also find such themes as the ancient and modern ethics of the self, agonistic games of citizenship (Isin, 2002), the governance of the social (Donzelot, 1988), biopolitics (Foucault, 1990), sovereignty (Butler, 2004), authoritarianism and domination (Dean, 2002; Hindess, 2001), strategies of governing through risk (O'Malley, 1996), crime (Simon, 1997) and much else.

While recognizing that Foucauldian political sociology presents us with a complex landscape, in the space of this short article I cannot begin to think through its possible implications. Instead, I shall confine my discussion to one particular analytic or 'diagram' of power: what Deleuze calls the society of control. The following section offers a brief discussion of control. In the remaining sections I explore some of the ways in which control, understood as an analytic rather than a new type of society, can advance the project of a genealogy of borders and, more broadly, modern systems of power.

Control

If we can speak of a Foucauldian political sociology that is committed, as I suggested already, to understanding power in terms of its multiple tactics and functionings, then Deleuze's idea of the control society surely deserves to be seen as an important contribution to such a project. In 'postscript on control societies', a short but highly suggestive essay, Deleuze (1995) argues that a new kind of power is coming to define the social and political life of states and citizens in the course of the latter part of the twentieth century. This is a power, a diagram

he calls 'control'. The word itself is perhaps unfortunate, invoking images of an Orwellian totally administered society. While Deleuze certainly does not see the rise of control as a benign phenomenon, neither is it a situation of perfected domination. What, then, is control?

Deleuze theorizes control by comparing its logic, its topology, its assumptions and its mechanisms to those of the 'disciplinary society' that it challenges and threatens to displace. Foucault associated disciplinary societies with the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. He emphasized that discipline was reducible neither to a particular institution nor apparatus but was instead 'a type of power, a modality for its exercise comprising a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets; it is a "physics" or an "anatomy" of power, a technology' (Foucault, 1977: 215). While discipline would have different objectives and targets depending on its particular site of deployment, it does have more general properties and characteristics. It is oriented by concerns of demographics and economy. Discipline confronts the 'floating population' of eighteenth-century Europe. It is an 'anti-nomadic technique'; this is why it 'fixes, arrests or regulates movements; it clears up confusion; it dissipates compact groupings of individuals wandering about the country in unpredictable ways; it establishes calculated distributions' (Foucault, 1977: 218–19). Finding its most visible and characteristic expressions in the school, the prison, the hospital and the factory, discipline operates a regime of confinement, segmentation and utilization. It works by spatio-temporal practices like the cell, the classroom, the timetable and the uniform, mechanisms which make it possible to organize a human multiplicity, both by totalizing and individualizing it, so as to maximize and extract its productive energies and capacities.

Foucault is clear that however central it was to the organization of modern societies, discipline represents only a particular 'technology' of power, and not power per se. With this in mind, Deleuze argues that today we are witnessing a generalized breakdown of disciplinary mechanisms. Disciplinary societies are gradually turning into control societies. Discipline involves a power that is concentrated in, if not contained by, sites of confinement. It deploys forms of authority that are exterior to the subject but which seek to effect relationships of interiorization and disciplined self-governance within its targets. Yet in control societies, power has become more fluid, less-centred. We have gone from moulding to modulation. Now it operates in fluctuating networks of production and consumption. Power has become immanent to social orders that understand themselves as 'consumer societies', 'information societies' or 'risk societies'. According to one influential interpretation: 'mechanisms of command become ever more "democratic", ever more immanent to the social field, distributed throughout the brains and the bodies of the citizens' (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 23). We are moving from an analogical world where the citizen circulates between such discrete sites as family, school and work, to a digital order where the lines between inside and out become blurred; a social order where power is inseparable from mechanisms and circuits of desire, which are actualized by systems of advertising, marketing and self-actualization.

According to Deleuze, the control society can be characterized in terms of certain key transformations. I shall mention three of these since they will enable us to raise new questions about the nature of rebordering. First, there is the shift in the *spatiality of power*: from forms of governance which privilege particular institutional sites of confinement to open networks of power which operate through variable combinations and productions of desire, lifestyle, anxiety and fear, and which have the market as their paradigm. I have already discussed this above and will return to it when exploring the displacement and delocalization of borders.

Second, there is a transformation in the dominant mechanisms and images of social order. If discipline nurtured the impossible dream of governing the state in the image of the well-ordered city (Foucault, 1984), control privileges the figure of communication, finding in information technology and computers its 'machine' (Deleuze, 1995: 180). Control societies implicate their constituent institutions and subjects in regimes of modulation and feedback. All fixed standards and norms are made to float:

Money . . . best expresses the difference between the two types of society, since discipline was always related to currencies containing gold as a numerical standard, whereas control is based on floating exchange rates, modulations depending on a code setting sample percentages for various currencies. (Deleuze, 1995: 180)

Here we might add that modulation finds its expression at the level of politics and the state in the relatively new style and ethos of government which political scientists call 'governance', or, what Jessop (1998: 42–3) qualifies as 'meta-governance' – a form of political authority that takes as its strategic objective the 'organization of self-organization'.

Third, there is a shift in assumptions about the *subject of power*, concerning what we might call the subject-effects of strategies of governance. One of the most distinctive features of Foucauldian political sociology is its ambition to combine an analytics of power and rule with a dynamic and historicized account of the subject. This sets it apart from approaches, such as behavioural or rational choice theories, which ontologize and universalize a particular conception of the subject as the foundation for their theoretical enterprises. With Foucauldian political sociology, one finds an emphasis on changing modes of individualization *and* collectivization. This is certainly the case with Deleuze who argues that whereas discipline set up a productive tension between masses and individuals, with control we witness a world of 'dividuals' whose context is not the mass or society, but proliferating databanks, samples, profiles, and markets.

Deleuze's notion of the dividual is somewhat vague. I want to give it two distinct but related meanings. First, the dividual signifies an apparent thinning-down, or even hollowing-out of strategies of governance. Disciplinary power was all-embracing, extending itself across the entire social field. Its ambition was to govern *omnes et singulatim*. This meant the marginal elements of society could not be ignored but had to be reformed, moralized, and integrated. If the *individual* signifies a complete, whole person, the *dividual* is partial, fragmented, and

incomplete. Control de-emphasizes or even abandons the quest to train, moralize, reform and remake the individual. It relinquishes the dream of an all-encompassing, normalized society. It is less bothered with reforming the young offender, than with securing the home or the shopping mall against their presence.

This does not mean that the society of control has abandoned projects of surveillance. On the contrary, surveillance is now “designed in” to the flows of everyday existence’ (Rose, 1999: 234). That the tactics of surveillance have multiplied is captured nicely by Deleuze’s reference to the technology of the password. Nothing better captures the ethos of the control society than the password, which can materialize in such forms as the credit card, the passport, the reward card, the identity card, and the electronic ankle tag. Even the body itself can operate as a password once imprinted by the indelible sign of the biometric (van der Ploeg, 1999). Control resolves its subject matter into ‘coded flows’ (Diken and Lautsen, 2003). If control societies resemble networks of privatized consumption and information, circuits of desire and lifestyle, these are networks whose every node is a potential gate or filter. Linked in a dynamic relationship to the database and the risk profile, the password distributes access and status. It constitutes privileged populations who enjoy the rewards of credit, mobility, and information. But at the same time it filters out, and constitutes a risky, excluded remainder.

This leads us to the second meaning of individual, one that Nikolas Rose has clarified. Here the meaning of individual draws attention to control as a particular strategy of social division. The underside of the control society is the cumulative production of abject populations, those either abandoned or forcibly placed outside the circuits of consumption and lifestyle, deemed to inhabit ‘forms of existence [that] are cast into a zone of shame, disgrace or debasement, rendered beyond the limits of the liveable, denied the warrant of tolerability, accorded purely a negative value’ (Rose, 1999: 253). These populations are excluded but simultaneously included within the control society. They are included, for instance, every time that political passion cathects itself in the scandal of the ‘welfare cheat’ or business capitalizes the labour of the undocumented and the non-citizen. Similarly, they are included whenever the image of these ‘outsiders’ forms the basis for the mobilization of fear and loathing, and, concomitantly, the marketing of ever more ingenious schemes of security, risk management and societal insulation.

But before proceeding to think about control as a lens for the study of borders today, it is necessary to enter a caveat. Given the brief, and schematic way that Deleuze presents the control society, namely by juxtaposing it with the disciplinary society, it is tempting to interpret this in stagist, even epochal terms. This would be to see control as a fundamentally new kind of society, like post-Fordism or the network society. Indeed, this is precisely how influential thinkers like Hardt and Negri (2000), and in a slightly different vein, Nancy Fraser (2003), have interpreted control. But to pursue this path exposes us to the dangers of overstating its significance. My point is that it is better to think of control as a

'diagram' (Deleuze, 1988: 34–6) than a form of society. Diagrams are necessarily abstract and serve to express 'something at work in many different institutions and situations, spread out in several countries, working in a manner not given in the map of social policies and prescriptions, planned as such by no one' (Rajchman, 1999: 47). Just as there are multiple ways to diagram a city, so we leave open the possibility of other, equally valid ways of diagramming the present. These include diagrams that point to the revival of older, seemingly archaic forms of power and domination – such as the contemporary phenomenon of indefinite detention (Butler, 2004) – which do not accord readily with the idea of control and its image of open, fluid, decentred power relations.

Border control

How might this thematization of control illuminate the event of rebordering? First, we consider the changing topography of the border.

New Spaces of Border Control

In his recent study of the political imagination of the modern state, Neocleous notes how the word 'frontier' (*frontière*) originally referred to the façade of a building or the front line of the army. Sometime in the sixteenth century it 'came to mean the boundaries or borders of a particular space and has been associated with state borders ever since' (Neocleous, 2003: 99). This is the modern idea of the border: a continuous line demarcating the territory and sovereign authority of the state, enclosing its domain. It corresponds most closely with the historical spatiality of political power which Agnew calls the 'field of forces': a geopolitical world of 'rigidly defined territorial units in which each state can gain power only at the expense of the others and each has total control over its own territory' (1999: 504). If discipline imagined the state as a city-state writ large, then the frontier was its wall.

However, a series of investigations suggest that today we are witnessing a 'delocalization' of the border. If policing and control functions were previously concentrated in this special place, it is argued that currently there is a disaggregation of border functions away from the border (Bigo, 2002: 77; Salter, 2004: 76). Delocalization has become evident in the case of the United States as part of that government's ongoing campaign against global terrorism. For instance, under the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Reform Act of 2002, greater effort is made to schedule policing and identification functions well before the traveller arrives at the border, but also, in certain cases, after they arrive on American soil (Salter, 2004: 76). In the case of the EU, Guiraudon and Lahav (2000) point to an aggregate of tendencies that they call 'remote control'. Remote control, they aver, involves a double displacement since it moves the locus of control activities away from the borders of the territory, and, in some cases, beyond the formal apparatus of the state:

Controlling the movement of people in the EU largely takes place away from the border, before 'undesirable' prospective migrants reach EU Member States ('remote control') or afterwards ('internal controls'). Along with civil servants (immigration officers, border patrols, liaison officers and consulate personnel), a wide range of 'sheriff's deputies' (Torpey, 1998) that include sending and transit countries, carriers, security agencies, travel agents and hotel personnel, employers, local social services, hosts and sponsors are all urged to reach deep into societies to uncover undocumented foreigners, deter asylum-seekers and prevent the exit of the 'huddled masses'. (Guiraudon, 2003)

It is probably fair to say that remote control has become an intrinsic feature of the way in which states and other international agencies imagine and pursue border control. It is written in to the conceptual architecture of the Europe's Schengen Agreement and, in different ways, the American idea of homeland security. One of the more prominent and in some cases controversial instruments of remote control today is carrier sanctions (Guiraudon, 2003: 201–6; IRU, 2001). This policy is worth considering briefly since it illustrates quite vividly certain trajectories that are remaking the topography of border control.

Few governments can have used carrier sanctions more vigorously than the UK government. Under the UK's carrier liability laws, private transporters – principally airlines, railway and shipping companies, and road hauliers – can be fined up to €2000 for each improperly documented passenger they transport into the national territory. To mitigate their exposure to such financial penalties, and with technical assistance from public and private security experts, the carriers now implement systematic measures to police migrants. In this way, carrier sanctions have played a part in making the check-in desks of airlines and even travel agents into semi-formal spaces of migration control, a development that threatens to erode the integrity of refugee rights (Gilboy, 1997: ECRE, 1999).

The case of road haulage is particularly interesting in this regard. If it is the case that cross-border trucking had recently emerged as a key pathway for clandestine migrants and refugees seeking to enter the UK from continental Europe, then carrier sanctions have sought to turn the truck and its entire routeway into a dispersed, mobile border. The nature of air travel largely precludes the possibility of clandestine migration. At the airport it's largely a matter of training airline staff in the techniques of document inspection – the verification of identity. But with trucking it's much more a question of detecting hidden bodies. To this end, the UK immigration service now provides companies and their staff with detailed instructions on what we might call the 'securitization' of the truck and its milieu (UK Immigration Service, 2004). The very surface of the truck is to be made impermeable to unauthorized entry. The outer fabric on the vehicle is to be suitably resistant to cutting open. All external storage compartments are to be secured with seals and padlocks. Drivers and their supervisors are to be trained in the responsibilities and procedures of regularly inspecting their own vehicles, especially when stopping en route at petrol stations and restaurants. Similarly, scanners and CO₂ detectors are to be used to mechanically see and smell every recess within the vehicle.

Can we say that with road haulage we have moved beyond even the situation where the UK relocates its borders to the desks of its overseas embassies and consulates, where visas are issued, or the check-in areas of airports in distant countries? Once applied to road haulage, the entire road transportation system becomes a kind of networked border. The border transforms into a mobile, non-contiguous zone materializing at the very surface of the truck and every place it stops. If the 1980s saw Europe's routeways identified and re-imagined as one of its foremost 'Trans-European Networks', an instrument to positively integrate Europe along new spatial and social axes (Barry, 1996), then carrier sanctions – and the many little practices this policy insinuates into the everyday conduct of transportation and commerce – aspire to project a regime of surveillance into the very capillaries of these same networks. The project becomes one of Trans-European networks of control.

It would be misleading to consider remote control as a recent invention. Zolberg dates the emergence of remote control to 1924 (1999: 75–6) when, in response to the perception of uncontrolled immigration from Europe and human chaos at its great ports, the US federal government put in place a system requiring 'all foreign nationals coming from overseas to produce an entry visa prior to boarding a US-bound vessel'. Similarly, it would be mistaken to see remote control as though it were the expression of some kind of social or technological logic; as though the border were simply one more setting where the inexorable tendency of the control society works itself out. Guiraudon and Lahav (2000) point to an interplay of quite specific political logics that underpin the spread of remote control today. These include a desire on the part of Western governments to intercept refugees before they have an opportunity to activate human rights claims within the territory. But they also include a concern to decongest border crossings in the interests of further liberalizing and accelerating circuits of transnational tourism, trade and production.

In short, we should not interpret the control society as the *cause* of the various practices and processes associated with remote control, so much as an account of the terrain on which border control is being effected. It takes us beyond the recognition of the 'securitization' of borders and other spaces, and towards a more precise account of the particular forms and practices that enact security. Like discipline, control is a technology that is capable of materializing at different sites and levels. When governments search for ways to insulate their territories from unwanted population flows, or ways to reconcile the quest for security with openness to cross-border economic activity, the solution has to come from somewhere. In a sense, it comes from elsewhere. What is useful about the idea of control is that it theorizes the form, the matter, the diagram of the response. This should become clearer when we consider border control as dividualization.

The Subjects of Border Control

If border controls are becoming in certain (but by no means all) respects more dispersed, what kinds of subjects do they presuppose? Consider the following

two cases drawn from the lively, interdisciplinary field of border studies. Matthew Sparke (2004) has written an illuminating little history of the problematization of border-crossing in the heavily urbanized region between Vancouver and Seattle, on the Pacific Coast of the North America. He recounts how local business elites successfully lobbied the US and Canadian governments to implement an expedited border crossing lane for vehicles in the early 1990s – PACE on the US side, and a reciprocal CANPASS for Canadians. Under PACE, and for a small fee, pre-screened applicants received a decal for their cars authorizing them for expedited border-crossing in the so-called PACE (fast) lane. PACE was justified by various arguments to the effect that it would promote cross-border trade, tourism, and even a pan-regional, Cascadian identity. From the perspective of the border guards it was consistent with the objective of distinguishing primary (safe) and secondary travellers.

PACE was to experience various political and logistical difficulties. In July 2002 the old PACE lane was replaced by a new scheme, NEXUS. Presented as a response to the 'new security environment', the unveiling of NEXUS was mediated by a new rhetoric. This rhetoric emphasizes the need to reconcile freedom and trade with heightened 'security'. Or as the slogan appended to the US-VISIT scheme puts it: 'Keeping America's doors open and our nation secure'. Like PACE, NEXUS seeks to sort pre-screened and self-identified travellers into high-risk and low-risk groups, combining this function with a commitment to expediting the mobility of the latter. Yet reflecting the new security consciousness, NEXUS incorporates new technologies of control to meet this end. These include a photo-ID and biometric 'proximity card' which relays passenger data from the approaching car to the border authority's computer screen.

In a study of what she calls the 'technological frontiers' of the EU, Ginette Verstraete (2001) focuses on the Belgian harbour of Zeebrugge and its joint venture with DielectroKinetic Laboratories (DKL), a US company which markets itself as an authority in 'the Science of Saving Lives'. For most of 1999 the harbour used DKL's most important product, its LifeGuard, to assist in the detection of clandestine migrants hiding in trailers. The LifeGuard is a remote sensing device which detects the ultra-low frequency signals of a beating heart's electromagnetic field. This technology was first developed by US military engineers, and came to be used by law enforcement agencies in searching buildings for criminals and in emergency rescue operations. However, in Zeebrugge it was used by a private security agency contracted by the port to detect and assist in the removal of refugees and unauthorized migrants hiding in trucks and containers destined for Britain. As Verstraete puts it: "the science of saving lives" became the science of removing them' (2001: 26).

The circumstances under which Zeebrugge formed this commercial and logistical alliance with DKL are quite telling. Zeebrugge was endeavouring to market itself as the pre-eminent node of transit in the automobile industry, a status it would eventually lose to the Dutch port of Vlissingen. Large numbers of migrants hiding in trucks and containers was posing a significant cost for companies like Ford and Vauxhall, so that Zeebrugge was under considerable

commercial pressure to provide improved security for its clients. At the same time, DKL sought to capitalize on the possibility of an emerging market in detecting and removing 'illegals' once it became clear there was commercial demand to use its technology in this way.

These are but two short border histories among the many thousands that could, no doubt, be written for different places, each with their peculiar and unique circumstances. Yet they serve to illustrate certain points I wish to make concerning the way in which particular kinds of subjects are positioned at the border. To begin with, they suggest that today borders operate like filters or gateways. Not borders as iron curtains or Maginot Lines, but more like firewalls differentiating the good and the bad, the useful and the dangerous, the licit and the illicit; constituting a safe, 'high-trust' interior secured from the wild zones outside; immobilizing and removing the risky elements so as to speed the circulation of the rest. It might be objected that borders have *always* served this function. But borders did other things besides. Perhaps this sorting function is becoming far more central to the practice of the border than before. I shall return to this point shortly.

What I find especially interesting is the particular sociotechnical arrangement through which this function of sorting humans and things is sought. Discipline was an assemblage combining certain architectures, expertise, norms, and practices like training and panoptic surveillance. If control is an assemblage, it is one that combines concepts (e.g., risk), materials which it comprehends as 'flow', scanners, codes, passwords, security professionals, gateways, and databanks. Like discipline it is a highly mobile, flexible technology capable of materializing in different sites. The port harbour, the airport, the shopping mall, the city centre, the office building – all quite different functional locales. Yet inasmuch as each faces certain commercial and public pressures to bring 'security' to its premises and users, to differentiate and manage mobile flows of population, then each thinks its solutions within the coordinates of these methods and technologies. Within this milieu, security becomes something to be marketed: a 'solution'. The technology of discipline placed the school, the prison, the workhouse in a certain series which Foucault called the 'carceral archipelago' (Foucault, 1977). It is important to recognize how the border belongs to its own series. Of course, the border remains a special place, its difference marked out in law, history and geography, and sanctified by rituals of sovereignty. Yet there is a sense in which today the experience of crossing the border is, for many people, not unlike entering a large corporate building, government ministry, a university library, gated residence or computer network. In each case the subject is scanned, identified and profiled. A databank is accessed, a record occurs, or perhaps access is denied. Such is the changing *texture* of borders.

Second, there is a point about the changing ends, and not just the means of surveillance. Some might see developments like NEXUS or DKL simply as further steps towards a panoptical society. Yet it is important to consider the ways in which these interventions diverge from the formulas of discipline. My point is that discipline, and the panopticon are specific technologies pertaining to

particular historical and social contexts. Consider that NEXUS and DKL are not in the business of individualization, at least not in the sense of encouraging subjects to govern themselves as 'individuals'. They are in many ways less deep, governing persons rather like baggage, mail, or in the case of LifeGuard, living matter. This is not to suggest that dividualization bears no relationship to practices and processes of identity. As NEXUS suggests, its version of dividualization is continuous with the culture of the reward card, of gold- and platinum-coded club memberships, and their associated 'lifestyle' of mobility and access. By contrast, LifeGuard is legitimated by the idea of 'asylum-seekers' and 'illegals' as the new kind of wandering, dangerous classes. But in both cases as a technology, control expresses little interest in shaping the identity, moulding the subjectivity of its targets. It's got no time for that.

I have argued that today the border governs us as dividuals, with all that that implies in terms of techniques, identities, practices and power relations. This will no doubt draw the objection: so what's new? Hasn't this always been a function of borders? True, the border has served other ends such as demarcating the sovereign's domain and the limits of the territory. But haven't the borders always been in the business of distinguishing the wanted from the unwanted, the safe from the dangerous, the national from the foreigner – at least since the early twentieth century, when passports become the norm, and borders became systematic instruments of population management (Salter, 2003; Sassen, 1999)?

Here we have to emphasize that the border is a multiplicity. It is certainly true that, in some minimal sense, borders have long been dedicated to the sorting, dividing, and separating of mobilities, but they have had other functions and purposes overlaid; they have formed other machinic connections. Consider, for example, the case of the great countries of immigration and settlement like Canada, Australia, United States, Argentina. By the start of the twentieth century it was clear that in these cases at least the border was not just, or even, a gateway into the national territory, but into (regional or national) *society*. Perhaps this is why Ellis Island and Nova Scotia's Pier 21, have taken their place alongside Checkpoint Charlie in what is evidently a thriving border control museum complex; and why The Rocks in Sydney is now a space of tourism and national heritage. If Ellis Island and Pier 21 have become museums, it is because they speak to a time that has passed. If these and other zones of arrival have acquired iconic status, it is not just because of the genius of the marketing industries. It is because they functioned not just as gateways into the territory, but points of arrival, reception and integration. Flows of migrants did not simply pass through. There were spaces where public authorities checked the health and social condition of immigrants (Bernard, 1998). However, at the same time these border sites were linked to a public and private networks for arranging travel into the interior, employment, housing, and distribution. There was a real sense in which the edges of American and Canadian society and territory coincided in these unique places.

No doubt many of these social processing functions are still undertaken in international airports today, but far less conspicuously. Certainly the function of

receiving the migrant does not define the identity of the airport in the way it once marked the seaport. For the technology and social context of the border have changed. The more that ports resemble nodes moving people in a global network (Heyman, 2004), that the status of 'immigrant' is officially conferred not upon but some time before or after the subject's arrival in a new land,² that transportation and communication systems overlay and deepen the transnational over the international, that international travel becomes an everyday experience and not a life-defining event, that airports resemble other melancholy 'non-places' (Augé, 1995) distinguished at most by simulacral quotations of their regional hinterlands, the more all these things obtain, then the less the border appears as threshold or gateway into a nation/society so much as one among many sorting points, nodes within a wider, albeit thinner social space. The territorial and the social no longer coincide as neatly as they once did. Perhaps this is the condition to which Balibar alludes when he notes the 'ubiquity of borders'; a condition in which, far from disappearing, borders proliferate, becoming 'a grid ranging over the new social space' rather than a line separating it from outside (Balibar, 2002: 84–5).

Conclusion

This article began with the observation that any genealogy of state borders and their role in the governance of western states would note how border control has moved closer and more fully towards functions of policing; and that it is discourses about organized crime, global terrorism, undocumented migration and other dangerous mobilities that legitimate and organize this shift. While such disciplines as international political economy, anthropology and criminology will surely have an important role to play in better explaining the changing nature of borders, I have argued that Foucauldian political sociology has a particular contribution to make. To illustrate this claim, I considered Deleuze's concept of control. Part of the value of this concept is to allow us to see continuities and resonances between the transformation of state border controls and other social fields.

A fuller account than this would explore some of the other ways in which the diagram of control might illuminate transformations in the border. For instance, we noted how the logic of modulation emerges as a key ordering principle, and finds its correlate in politics with the emphasis on 'governance'. One could certainly show how there is a modulation of borders. There is a modulation in the way that a political-administrative system like the EU, through its programme of Justice and Home Affairs and its becoming-territorial (Walters and Haahr, 2005: 111–12), renders the border controls of its member and its neighbouring states into calculable, comparable data and makes them subject to continuous adjustment. Clearly, there is now a sense in which border control has been made relative, dynamic and performance-oriented.³ Yet there is also a modulation to the border in the sense that border control has become a game, a strategic

competition played out between states, officials and experts, on the one hand, and, on the other, 'autonomous migrants' (Mezzadra, 2004; Rodriguez, 1996) and those who facilitate and exploit their mobility. No sooner is one border crossing updated, one smuggling route closed down, and another opens up. Border control is like antivirus software, not just because it aspires to filter and secure its interior, but also because its fate is to toil in the shadow of the restless hacker.

Yet a fuller genealogy of the border would not confine its attention to control simply because not all power relations tend in this direction. I noted at the outset that Foucauldian political sociology has produced a rich set of analytics of power, including sovereignty, biopolitics and ethnopolitics. A more comprehensive understanding of the event of rebordering will need to consider terrains and logics as well.

Notes

- 1 See Hindess (2000) who discusses the international state system as a 'dispersed regime of governance'. This regime utilizes the principle of citizenship to legitimate its division of 'a large, culturally diverse, and interdependent world population' into a 'series of discrete subpopulations' that are set against one another (2000: 1494–5).
- 2 For instance, in fiscal year 2000, '52 percent of immigrants were already in the [US] when their visas became available. This means that being admitted as an immigrant does not equate with traveling to the United States to begin a new life, as was true in the nineteenth century' (Martin, 2004: 54–5). On the decoupling of 'immigration control' and 'border control', see Crowley (2003: 33–4) and Bigo (2000).
- 3 See, for example, Brown (2004) who surveys the border management capacities of states on the EU's periphery. Assessing and comparing the state of border control across nations, and helping to construct a knowledge of border authorities in terms of their 'performance', this kind of work can be interpreted not just as a commentary on the EU's own review process, but a mediating element in the modulation of borders in its own right.

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